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Property and financial matters 
upon the breakdown of de facto 
relationships
Rachel Carson
Reforms introduced in 2009 to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) have meant that most same-
sex and opposite-sex de facto couples (in all states and territories except Western Australia) 
who end their relationships can now have their property and financial matters dealt with in 
substantially the same way as married people. This paper aims to provide non-legal professionals 
in the family law sector with a general outline of the relevant reforms, their genesis, and the 
arguments in favour of and against their introduction.
Please note: The content of this paper is intended only to provide general information in summary form. It is not legal advice 
and should not be relied upon as such. Legal and other professional advice should be sought by you or your organisation.
KEY MESSAGES
  The 2009 reforms to the Family Law Act (Cth) brought most Australian same-sex and opposite-sex de 
facto couples within the federal family law system for the resolution of their property and financial 
matters upon separation.
  The reforms introduced a definition of de facto relationship and provided guidance to assist in 
determining whether a de facto relationship may be said to exist.
  The reforms enable access to property settlement and maintenance for most separated de facto 
couples in terms substantially the same as those available for married couples.
  The reforms enable most de facto couples to enter into Binding Financial Agreements, prior to 
commencing their relationship, during their relationship and upon separation.
  The reforms were aimed at extending the federal family law property and financial settlements 
regime to opposite-sex and same-sex de facto couples. They received strong support but have also 
been subject to criticism, including on the basis of their imposition of the consequences of marriage 
upon people who have made a conscious decision not to marry.
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Introduction
Prior to 1 March 2009, people in de facto relationships were able to access the federal family law 
system in relation to their post-separation parenting arrangements. However, their property and 
financial settlements were covered by separate legislation that applied in their state or territory. 
Property and financial settlements generally accommodate the arrangements for dividing the former 
couple’s assets and liabilities and whether (and if so, how much) maintenance is to be payable.
In practical terms, this legal situation meant that where matters could not be resolved by agreement, 
separating de facto couples were required to issue proceedings in the federal family law system 
with respect to their parenting arrangements, and to issue separate proceedings in their state/
territory system in relation to their property and financial issues. This contrasts with the situation 
of separated married couples Australia-wide who have been able to access the federal family 
law system since its inception, for both their parenting and property/financial matters under the 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (hereafter referred to as “the FLA”). Previously, a broader range of 
considerations applied to the property and financial settlements of married people as compared to 
those applicable under some de facto property/financial regimes.
Recent changes to the FLA (applicable to all states and territories except Western Australia) mean 
that most same-sex and opposite-sex de facto couples can now have their property and financial 
disputes dealt with in substantially the same way as married couples, within the same specialist, 
federal family law system.1 This means that these de facto couples are no longer required to incur 
the stress, financial expense and inconvenience of issuing separate proceedings in two different 
court systems for their post-separation parenting orders and property/financial settlement. It also 
means that the wider range of considerations for dealing with property and financial arrangements 
and the broader decision-making approach to the application of the relevant legislative provisions 
taken by the Family Law Courts applies to most couples who have separated, regardless of whether 
they were in a marriage, same-sex or opposite-sex de facto relationship.
To enable this change, all states, except Western Australia,2 referred the relevant legislative powers 
to the Commonwealth, leading to the enactment of Part VIIIAB of the FLA, so that the Family Court 
of Australia and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia can now deal with property and financial 
matters arising from the breakdown of de facto relationships.3 The reforms also provided for the 
extension of the superannuation splitting provisions (that allow for the division of superannuation 
funds between married couples) to former de facto partners and also for FLA binding financial 
agreements to be an option for de facto couples.
This research paper is aimed at providing non-legal professionals in the family law sector with a 
general outline of these significant reforms, which were introduced by the Family Law Amendment 
(De Facto Financial Matters and Other Measures) Act 2008 (Cth) (hereafter referred to as “the 
reforms”). Following a summary of the reforms, including the concept of a de facto relationship and 
an outline of the applicable considerations in the determination of property and financial matters, 
the paper will consider the rationale for these reforms. This will be followed by a discussion of 
arguments in favour of and critical of the reforms, and implications arising from their introduction.
1 Couples falling outside the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) definition of de facto relationship may still be covered by state/territory legislation and/or by general law, 
including common law and the law of trusts and equity.
2 The Family Court Act 1997 (WA) provides for the Family Court of Western Australia to make property and financial orders for same-sex and opposite-sex de facto 
partners separating after 1 December 2002 (subject to the hurdle requirements, including the relationship requirements in s 205Z of the Family Court Act 1997 
(WA)). See s 13A of the Interpretation Act 1984  (WA) for guidance in relation to the term de facto relationship in this context.
3 The Australian states referred the relevant legislative powers regarding the financial matters arising out of de facto relationships in accordance with s 51(xxxvii) 
of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act. Note that the Commonwealth relied upon its powers over the territories to apply the amended Family Law 
Act 1975 (Cth) to the Northern Territory and to the Australian Capital Territory. The Commonwealth’s power to legislate in family law matters for married couples 
derives from s 51(xxi) (“marriage power”), s 51(xxii) (“divorce and matrimonial causes power”) and s 51(xxxix) (“incidental power”) of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act.
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Part 1: Summary of the reforms
What is the legal definition of a de facto relationship?
The reforms to the FLA provide that two people may be said to be in a de facto relationship if, 
“having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship”, they are “a couple living together on 
a genuine domestic basis”, they are not legally married to each other and they are not related to 
each other by family.4 As a result of the reforms the FLA now also clearly articulates that a de facto 
relationship can exist between two people of the same sex or two people of different sexes. A de 
facto relationship can also exist where one person in that relationship is also married or in another 
de facto relationship.5 The FLA provides that these circumstances could include any or all of the 
following circumstances included in Box 1 below.6
Box 1: Circumstances indicative of a de facto relationship
  the duration of the relationship;
  the nature and extent of their common residence;
  whether a sexual relationship exists;
  the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support 
between them;
  the ownership, use and acquisition of their property;
  the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;
  whether the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a state or territory as a prescribed 
kind of relationship;
  the care and support of children; and
  the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.
Note: These circumstances are enumerated in s 4AA(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
The FLA provides significant discretion with respect to the weight that may be accorded to the 
listed circumstances, and no particular finding about any of these circumstances is required or 
is decisive on the question of whether a de facto relationship exists.7 Moreover, the court is also 
“entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem 
appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the case”.8 That is, it is not an exhaustive list of 
relevant circumstances and is not meant to exclude the consideration of other circumstances that 
may emerge as relevant in a given case.
Recent case law considering the question of whether a de facto relationship exists, suggests that 
the question of whether a de facto relationship exists is one to be determined by reference to 
the FLA definition, rather than in accordance with “external society views of what constitutes a 
de facto relationship or by what the parties themselves thought their relationship to be”.9 Some 
cases have referenced a notion of “coupledom”, which has been identified as being “the core 
4 s 4AA(1) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). s 4AA(6) provides that two persons are related by family if (a) one is the child (including an adopted child) of the other; or 
one is another descendant of the other (even if the relationship between them is traced through an adoptive parent); or (c) they have a parent in common (who 
may be an adoptive parent of either or both of them). 
5 s 4AA(5) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
6 s 4AA(1)c) and s 4AA(2) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
7 s 4AA(3) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
8 s 4AA(4) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
9 Gissing v Sheffield [2012] FMCAfam 1111 [21] per O’Sullivan J, quoting Bender FM in Dakin v Sansbury [2010] FMCAfam 628 [13]. See also Sinclair v Whittaker 
(2013) FLC 93-551.
4  |  Australian Institute of Family Studies
CHILD FAMILY COMMUNITY AUSTRALIA
of a de facto relationship” involving the “merger of two lives”.10 Nevertheless, the decided cases 
indicate that a couple are not required to live together on a full-time basis or even for a majority 
of the time during the period of their relationship for it to be characterised as de facto in nature.11 
Indeed, it has also been held that a de facto relationship may be established where the partners 
maintain “very individual lives as a couple preferring not to merge their existences”.12 Evidence of 
inconsistent representations of the nature of a relationship made by a person in the relationship 
to bodies such as financial institutions, statutory child protection agencies, Centrelink or State 
Revenue have also been considered as not preventing a finding that a de facto relationship had 
existed.13 Further guidance about the circumstances that may or may not satisfy the requirements 
necessary to establish a de facto relationship are available from the recent case law in this area 
and three examples are discussed in Box 2. Importantly, the onus of proving the existence of a 
de facto relationship lies with the person making the application for a declaration of property 
interests and/or for an alteration of property interests and/or an application for maintenance. Where 
such applications are made, and are supported by a claim that a de facto relationship existed, the 
court may, for the purposes of determining the substantive property/financial proceedings, make a 
declaration that the relevant de facto relationship existed or never existed.14
10 Jonah v White [2011] FamCA 221.
11 Moby v Schulter [2010] FamCA 748 [140] per Mushin J. See also Jonah v White [2012] FamCAFC 200; Sinclair v Whittaker (2013) FLC 93-551 and Smyth v Pappas 
[2011] FamCA 434.
12 Smyth v Pappas [2011] FamCA 434 [7] per Cronin J and see also Sinclair v Whittaker (2013) FLC 93-551.
13 Sinclair v Whittaker (2013) FLC 93-551; Gissing v Sheffield [2012] FMCAfam 1111 and Onslow v Onslow [2013] FCCA 1434.
14 s 90RD(1) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Note also that s 90RD(2) provides that the court may also make a declaration about: the period or periods of the de facto 
relationship for the purposes of s 90SB(a); whether there is a child of the de facto relationship, whether one of the parties made substantial contributions referred 
to in s 90SM(4)(a), (b) or (c); when the de facto relationship ended and where each of the parties to the de facto relationship were ordinarily resident during the de 
facto relationship.  
Box 2: Case studies: Is there a legal de facto relationship?
The following case studies are based on judgments of the Family Court of Australia and the Federal Circuit 
Court of Australia and are intended to provide examples of the decision-making process when determining 
whether a de facto relationship has been established for the purposes of the FLA.
Gissing v Sheffield [2012] FMCAfam 1111: De facto relationship established
The couple in this case had been in a relationship for 17 years during which time they had lived in several 
properties, both together and separately. They had shared common residences for “significant periods of time”.
The couple’s business continued throughout the period of the relationship and they had an ongoing financial 
relationship until separation that involved “a very high degree of financial dependence by the respondent 
[female partner] on the applicant [male partner] and more importantly interdependence between the parties” 
[para 163]. The couple held joint bank accounts and intermingled their finances.
Throughout the relationship the couple bought and sold a number of properties together, and although only 
one person’s name was registered on title, joint funds were applied to the purchases.
The relationship was not clandestine in nature and the couple “acted and were treated by others as [owning] 
property together and carrying out work or renovations on those assets together” [para 179].
The couple’s relationship was indicative of a degree of commitment to a mutual shared life, with the couple 
“carrying on a mutual enterprise of sharing income … and shared payment of expenses for their mutual 
support …” [para 197].
The “exact nature of the sexual relationship of the parties” was unclear on the evidence but the court accepted 
that there was a sexual relationship.
Box 2 continues on next page
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The male partner in this case made inconsistent representations to Centrelink but these representations did 
not mean that the relationship was not a de facto relationship for the purposes of the FLA.
A de facto relationship was established on these facts.
Jonah v White [2012] FamCAFC 200: De facto relationship not established
The male and female in this case had also been in a relationship for 17 years, which began shortly after the 
female commenced working for a business conducted by the male.
The male paid $24,000 to assist the female purchase a house and he also paid her a monthly financial sum 
for a period of 11 years.
The male and female saw each other for around two or so days every second or third weekend, travelled 
overseas together for a period of two and a half weeks and spent similar time periods together on occasion 
in Australia.
The male and female had a longstanding relationship in which they had a consistent sexual relationship. The 
female regarded it as an exclusive relationship and the male conceded that the relationship was “exclusive 
(save for ‘a few one night stands’) and his relationship with his wife” [para 28].
However, the male and female maintained separate households and did not own any joint property or pool 
resources.
Their relationship was clandestine and there was no evidence of any relationship or intended relationship 
between the female and the male’s children who were young when the relationship commenced.
The male and female did not have a reputation as a couple, rarely mixed with each other’s friends and there 
were “very few public aspects to their relationship” [para 69].
A de facto relationship was not established on these facts.
Sinclair v Whittaker (2013) FLC 93–551: De facto relationship established
The couple began dating in late 2002 and began a sexual relationship in January 2003. At this time, the couple 
resided at separate residences.
In August 2004, the female’s housemate vacated her residence and the male moved some of his belongings 
into her residence and began paying $600 per month towards the rent.
In December 2005, the couple purchased a property with the male paying the deposit and stamp duty, and 
with both parties contributing funds to be used for the acquisition of furnishings and accessories for this 
property. The female lived at the property permanently and the male lived there approximately three nights 
per week.
The couple “enjoyed a shared life and consistently, rather than exclusively, shared accommodation and many 
other activities, both recreational and day-to-day” [para 33]. The couple visited family members together 
and shared significant events with each other’s family members. The male referred to the female’s mother as 
“Mum”, and the male’s driver and personal assistant also regarded the parties as a couple.
Apart from the purchase of the property, the couple kept their finances separate.
The male gave the female a 2.17-carat diamond promise ring.
The female made representations to government agencies and lenders that she was single rather than living 
in a de facto relationship. This fact was taken into account as part of the circumstances of the case, but this 
representation and her perception of the relationship at this time were not determinative.
A de facto relationship was established on these facts.
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Prerequisites for non-married people seeking property adjustment or maintenance
The question of whether a relationship is a de facto relationship, together with the question of 
when a de facto relationship may be said to have commenced, are questions of significance in the 
context of property and financial settlements. This is because the FLA provides that to seek an order 
for property adjustment or maintenance where the couple were not married, one of the following 
“gateway requirements” (Watts, 2009, p. 126) must be satisfied that:
  the period or total of the period of the de facto relationship is at least two years;15 or
  there is a child of the de facto relationship;16 or
  one person in the relationship made contributions of a substantial nature and a failure to make 
an order or declaration would result in serious injustice;17 or
  the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a state or territory.18
In addition to these requirements, there are also geographical requirements relating to the ordinary 
residence of the person/s in the relationship to be satisfied in order for the FLA regime to apply to 
a de facto couple.19
The significance of an early determination on the threshold question of whether a de facto 
relationship has been established has been highlighted in recent case law. This is because a de 
facto relationship must be established prior to the court exercising its jurisdiction; for example, to 
make orders for interlocutory injunctions (i.e., a provisional or interim order made during a court 
proceeding) restraining a partner from evicting another partner from real estate in their name, or 
otherwise dealing with that property.20
The questions of whether and when a couple have separated may also be contested. This is 
because applications for orders for property settlement or maintenance must be made within two 
years of the date that the de facto relationship ended, unless leave (permission) is granted by the 
court to permit the application to be made out of time.21
As with marriages, the issue of whether and when a de facto couple has separated is a question of 
fact to be determined in the context of the particular relationship. Therefore, the fact that a couple 
are no longer living at the same residence or the fact that either or both partners are engaging in 
sexual relations outside the de facto relationship, may not be sufficient evidence of separation. In 
cases where the couple had registered their de facto relationship in accordance with their relevant 
state or territory legislation, separation may be more clearly established by the termination or 
revocation of a registered relationship.
The date of separation is also relevant from the perspective of whether the reforms apply to the 
relationship. This is because only de facto relationships that have broken down since 1 March 2009 
(1 July 2010 for South Australia)22 or cases where the former couple agree to opt in to the FLA de facto 
15 s 90SB(a) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). See Dahl v Hamblin  (2011) FLC 93-480 [48] where the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia held that “one or both 
(de facto partners) may commence proceedings under Part VIIIAB if they can establish that their relationship has existed for periods aggregating at least two years 
and that at least one of those periods occurred after the commencement of Part VIIIAB on 1 March 2009. It matters not at least for the purposes of establishing 
jurisdiction under s 90SB [jurisdiction with respect to maintenance, declarations of property interests and alterations of property interests (property settlements)], 
how long ago the other period, or periods occurred, or what were the circumstances of any breakdown in the relationship …”. 
16 s 90SB(b) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
17 s 90SB(c) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Note that in this subsection, “substantial contributions” refers to substantial contributions of a kind referred to in 
s 90SM(4)(a), (b) and (c).
18 s 90SB(d) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). 
19 s 90RG, s 90SK and s 90SK(1A) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
20 See, for example, Norton v Locke (2013) FLC 93-567.
21 s 44(5) and s 44(6) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
22 s 2 of the Family Law Amendment (Validation of Certain Orders and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) provided for a commencement date of 1 March 2009 for the 
exercise of jurisdiction by New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania, Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory and Norfolk Island with respect to the 
de facto reforms introduced by the  Family Law Amendment (De facto Financial Matters and Other Measures) Act 2008 (Cth) and of 1 July 2010 for the exercise of 
such jurisdiction in South Australia. 
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property/financial regime,23 are covered by the reforms. For those couples who separated prior to 
1 March 2009 (or 1 July 2010 for South Australian de facto couples) and who do not agree to opt in 
to the FLA regime and those couples whose relationship falls outside of the FLA requirements of a de 
facto relationship, the property and financial matters arising out of their relationship may be dealt with 
in accordance with their relevant state or territory legislation and/or general law, including common 
law and the law of trusts and equity.
How are property and financial matters now dealt with for separating de facto 
couples?
The discussion above has identified that from 1 March 2009 for all states and territories (except 
Western Australia and from 1 July 2010 for South Australia), property division and other financial 
arrangements upon the breakdown of both opposite-sex and same-sex de facto relationships have 
been dealt with under the umbrella of the federal family law system. As noted above, prior to the 
reforms, de facto couples were covered by state and territory legislative regimes and/or by general 
law. Initially this legislation dealt only with opposite-sex de facto couples, but from the mid 1990s, 
the states and territories began amending the relevant legislation to extend the law’s application 
to same-sex couples. Before the current federal reforms, the property and financial settlement 
provisions applicable to de facto couples upon separation differed across the state and territory 
legislative regimes.24
The following discussion will outline the property and financial provisions applicable to de facto 
couples as introduced by the reforms.
Factors governing property settlement
The provisions in Part VIIIAB (at s 90SL and s 90SM) of the FLA regulating the declaration of property 
interests (identifying each partner’s interests in the property) and the alteration (redistribution) of 
property interests between separated de facto couples, parallel the provisions applicable to married 
couples.25
Overarching just and equitable question
Consistent with property/financial cases involving married partners, the FLA provides that the 
overarching question in property/financial matters for separating de facto couples is whether or not 
it is “just and equitable in all the circumstances” of the case to make an order for property/financial 
settlement between the parties.26 The case law applying the property and financial settlement regime 
to married couples indicates that the breakdown of a marriage (and now also the breakdown of a 
de facto relationship) “does not bring, as an automatic consequence, an alteration of existing legal 
and equitable interests [in the pool of assets]. Just as, if an order is to be made, equality is neither 
to be assumed nor is it a starting point … the making of an order at all is not to be assumed”.27
At the time of writing, there exists some uncertainty surrounding the manner in which the just and 
equitable requirement is to be applied.28 It is arguable, based on recent case law, that the existing 
legal and equitable interests of each partner in the asset pool are to be identified so as to inform the 
23 See Item 86A of the Family Law Amendment (De facto Financial Matters and Other Measures) Act 2008 (Cth). 
24 For discussion of the state and territory regimes in place prior to the reforms, see for example Fehlberg, & Behrens (2008), pp. 564–582; 588–589; Millbank 
(2006), pp. 82, 83–85; Willmott, Mathews, & Shoebridge (2003), pp. 39–40; and Kovacs (2009), pp. 108–109. See also Young, Monahan, Sifris, & Caroll (2013), 
pp. 623–627, 826–844, for further historical and also more recent discussion of the state and territory legislative regimes.
25 s 78 and s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). s 90SM provides for the alteration of the interests of the former de facto partners  (or altering the interests of the 
bankruptcy trustee with respect to vested bankruptcy property) including orders for settlement or transfer of property. s 90SL of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) 
provides for a declaration to be made (subsequent to the breakdown of a de facto relationship) as to the former partners’ interests in the property, together with  
the power to make consequential orders for the sale, partition or possession of that property. 
26 s 90SM(3) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
27 Watson v Ling (2013) FLC 93-527, [14] per Murphy J applying Stanford v Stanford (2012) 293 ALR 70 [39].
28 See, for example, discussion in Parkinson (2013). 
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consideration of whether it is just and equitable to make an order for property/financial settlement 
between the parties, as a precondition to, or at least separately from, the application of the FLA 
provisions regarding the assessment of contributions and additional considerations detailed below.29
What is included in the pool of assets and liabilities?
Property or assets of the de facto partners (whether in both or either party’s name) may include real 
estate, funds in accounts with banks or other financial institutions, shares, interests in businesses/
companies and trusts, vested interests in estates and household chattels.30 Superannuation interests 
are also treated as property.31 Indeed, it was following the reforms that orders for property 
settlement with respect to de facto relationships incorporated the allocation of superannuation 
interests between former de facto partners, in the same way as has been possible for their married 
counterparts since 2002.32 Liabilities may include mortgages, business or other loans, hire purchase 
or lease agreements, credit card debt and other personal debt.33
Assessment of contributions
When determining what orders (if any) to make by way of property settlement between the 
former de facto partners, the following types of contributions, which are specified in the FLA, are 
considered:34
(1) Financial contributions; and/or
(2) Non-financial contributions
that are made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of either de facto partner or a child of the de 
facto relationship:
 to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the 
de facto relationship or either of them; or
 otherwise in relation to this property.
Direct financial contributions to the acquisition of an asset are those made to the purchase/cost 
price of the asset, for example, to the purchase price of real estate. Financial contributions to the 
conservation and improvement of an asset include payments towards the cost of repairs, maintenance 
and enhancements of that asset. Indirect financial contributions include contributions made towards 
expenses other than those directly related to the purchase, maintenance or improvement of the 
relevant asset (for example, the payment of living expenses such as utilities and groceries). Non-
financial contributions include those contributions made to the relevant asset that are not financial 
in character. Each of these contributions may be considered regardless of whether the property 
remains the property of either de facto partner or of a child of the de facto relationship.
(3) Contributions made by a de facto partner to the welfare of the family (constituted by the 
parties to the de facto relationship and any children of the de facto relationship), including any 
contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent; and
(4) Any child support that a de facto partner has provided, is to provide, or may be liable to 
provide in the future for a child of the de facto relationship.
29 See Parkinson (2013), pp. 82–86.
30 See s 4(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and case law discussion regarding what constitutes property including Duff v Duff (1977) FLC 90-217; White v White  
(1979) FLC 90-682; Mullane v Mullane (1983) FLC 91-303; Best v Best (1993) FLC 92-418; Biltoft v Biltoft  (1995) FLC 92-614; B v B (2000) FLC 93-002; Coghlan 
v Coghlan (2005) FLC 93-220; Kennon v Spry (2008) FLC 93-388; Pittman v Pittman (2010) FLC 93-430; Sand v Sand (2012) FLC 93-519; Martin v Newton (2011) 
FLC 93-490.
31 s 90MC(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
32 s 90MC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
33 See case law discussion of what may constitute a liability including Biltoft v Biltoft (1995) FLC 92-614. 
34 s 90SM(4) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
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Upon assessing these contributions, a percentage division of the net pool of assets between the 
former de facto partners may be determined, which may then be adjusted following any of the 
applicable additional prospective considerations outlined directly below.
Additional considerations: Consideration of prospective factors relating to the future needs of the 
parties
Following the assessment of contributions, consideration needs to be given to whether an adjustment 
should be made to the percentage division of assets on the basis of additional prospective factors, 
primarily relating to the future needs of the former partners. These additional, prospective 
considerations are enumerated in s 90SM(4) of the FLA as follows:
  the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either de facto partner; and
  the considerations specified in s 90SF(3) of the FLA, so far as they are relevant (see further in 
Box 3); and
  any other order made under the FLA affecting a party or child of the de facto relationship.
Box 3: “Future needs” considerations
The “future needs” considerations that are drawn from the maintenance provisions in s 90SF(3) of the FLA 
include:
  the age and state of health of each of the de facto parties;
  the income, property and financial resources of each of the de facto parties and the physical and mental 
capacity of each of them for appropriate gainful employment;
  whether either party has the care or control of a child (under 18 years) of the de facto relationship;
  the commitments of each of the de facto parties that are necessary to enable the party to support 
themselves, a child or another person that the party has a duty to maintain;
  the responsibilities of either de facto party to support any other person;
  the eligibility of either de facto party for a pension, allowance or benefit;
  a standard of living that is reasonable;
  the extent to which the payment of maintenance would increase the earning capacity of the recipient 
by enabling them to undertake education or training or to establish a business or otherwise obtain an 
adequate income;
  the effect of any proposed order on the ability of a creditor to recover their debt;
  the extent to which the de facto party whose maintenance is under consideration has contributed to the 
income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the other party;
  the duration of the de facto relationship and the extent to which it has affected the earning capacity of the 
party whose maintenance is under consideration;
  the need to protect a de facto party who wishes to continue that party’s role as a parent;
  if either de facto party is cohabiting with another person—the financial circumstances relating to that 
cohabitation;
  any fact or circumstance which in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case requires to be taken into 
account;
  the terms of a de facto financial agreement that is binding on either or both parties to the de facto 
relationship; and
  the terms of any financial agreement that is binding on either or both de facto parties to the de facto 
relationship.
Note: For a complete list of the “future needs” considerations see s 90SF(3) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
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The cross-reference to the considerations specified in s 90SF(3) draws on the maintenance or “future 
needs” considerations to assist in determining whether an adjustment is required to the preliminary 
percentage division of the pool of assets that was based on the partners’ contributions. These 
considerations are broad in scope and, as foreshadowed above, include the factors outlined in Box 3.
The inclusion of these “future needs” considerations in the provisions applicable to de facto 
relationships, brings the approach taken for most separating de facto couples in line with the long-
standing approach taken to determining property settlement between married couples.35 Prior to 
the reforms, a less extensive range of factors were nominated for consideration in the context of 
property adjustments between de facto couples in some states and territories (for example, New South 
Wales, South Australia and the Northern Territory) where considerations of the kind captured in the 
“additional considerations” were not included at that time.36 Decision-makers exercising this state/
territory jurisdiction also tended to focus on assessing the contributions of former de facto partners as 
opposed to conducting the broader “completely open family law enquiry” (CCH, 2014, para. 57–260).
Extending the application of maintenance and binding financial agreements to de facto relationships
Prior to the reforms, maintenance for de facto couples was not available nation-wide. In the states 
and territories where it was available, the provisions were not uniform. As a result of the reforms, 
former de facto partners may seek and receive maintenance on the same basis as their married 
counterparts, that is, if the payer is “reasonably able” to pay and the payee is unable to “support 
himself or herself adequately”.37 A payee may be unable to support themselves by reason of having 
the care of a child of the relationship, or because of their “age or physical or mental incapacity for 
appropriate gainful employment or for any other adequate reason”.38
The prospective “future needs” considerations outlined in Box 3 (on page 9) are the considerations 
to be applied in the assessment of an application for maintenance and, as noted earlier, these are 
consistent with the considerations applicable in the context of spousal maintenance applications 
between married couples.
As noted in section two above, since the reforms de facto couples in all states and territories (except 
Western Australia) can also make FLA binding financial agreements that stipulate the property and 
financial arrangements that will apply post separation, with a view to avoiding the need to apply to 
the court to determine or approve these arrangements.39 The provisions that cover binding financial 
agreements between de facto couples, in large part, reflect the provisions that are in place for married 
couples and they permit de facto partners to enter into pre-relationship agreements, agreements 
during the period of the de facto relationship, and upon the breakdown of the de facto relationship.40 
Although couples entering binding financial agreements are not required to have the content of their 
agreements approved by the court (as is required by consent orders for property/financial settlement), 
there is, at present, some level of uncertainty associated with the application of the law relating to 
binding financial agreements, which may affect both married and de facto couples alike who do not 
wish to have their property/financial settlements governed by the FLA provisions.41
35 See s 79 and s 75(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
36 Note, however, that, for example, the Relationships Act 2008 (Vic) had made provisions for the court to consider the “future needs”/maintenance factors in the 
decision-making process: s 45 (which incorporates the maintenance considerations in s 51 of that Act).
37 See s 90SE and s 90SF of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), in particular s 90SF(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
38 s 90SF(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Note that a payee’s entitlement to receive an “income tested pension, allowance or benefit” is to be disregarded when 
determining whether maintenance is payable, s 90SF(4)
39 Division 4 of Part VIIIAB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
40 Financial agreements between de facto parties that pre-dated the reforms may also be regarded as binding financial agreements under the FLA if they comply with 
current FLA requirements with respect to making binding financial agreements.
41 See, for example, the discussion of the interpretation of s 90G(1)(c) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) in Parker v Parker  [2012] FLC 93-499 in Campbell (2012). 
Property and financial matters upon the breakdown of de facto relationships   |  11
Part 2: History and arguments for and against the reforms
What was the rationale for these reforms?
The explanatory memorandum accompanying the Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial 
Matters and Other Measures) Bill 2008 identified that the introduction of the reforms was aimed at 
providing a “nationally consistent financial settlement regime” that would apply upon the breakdown 
of de facto relationships and marriages alike by extending “the financial settlement regime under 
the Act (FLA) to parties to a de facto relationship” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008b, p. 1).
While the FLA has been applied in the determination of parenting arrangements regardless of marital 
status since the 1980s, calls to remove the remaining legal distinctions with respect to property and 
financial matters for opposite-sex and same-sex de facto couples (thereby extending to them the 
protection of the federal family law system) gained increasing momentum.42 In his second reading 
speech introducing the reform bill to Parliament, the former Commonwealth Attorney-General 
Robert McClelland referred to a broader federal government policy against discrimination on the 
basis of sexuality, and described the provision of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal Family Law 
Courts with respect to the legal consequences of all relationship breakdown as being consistent 
with this goal (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008a). The goal of rectifying laws that discriminate 
against people (and their children) on the basis of their marital status or sexuality was an important 
factor driving these calls for reform (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 2007; 
Weston, Qu & Kaspiew, 2008). In its report Same-Sex: Same Entitlements, the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission observed the benefits of extending the application of the FLA 
property/financial regime as:
  including access to the federal family law system, which operated on the basis of a more broadly 
defined concept of property (that included superannuation) that tended to “attribute a higher 
value to non-financial homemaking contributions”;
  adopt a broader view of future needs as well as past contributions when determining property 
settlements; and
  to make use of “cheaper and faster” dispute resolution mechanisms (p. 273).
The “long overdue” reforms meant that separating de facto couples would be covered by legislative 
provisions equivalent to those applicable to married couples and would no longer be required to 
run parallel matters in separate courts for parenting and for property/financial arrangements, with 
the amendments enabling single proceedings to be issued in the federal family law court system to 
resolve both post-separation parenting and property/financial issues (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2008a; Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008, p. 13 and Chapter 2 
generally).
The Family Court of Australia and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (then known as the Federal 
Magistrates Court of Australia)43 were identified as the most efficient and effective forums, being “the 
specialist courts in Australia with vast experience in relationship breakdown matters … [and with] 
procedures and dispute resolution mechanisms which are more suited to handling family litigation 
arising on relationship breakdown”, thus ameliorating the differences arising from the varying 
state and territory de facto property and financial regimes (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008a; 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2008b, p. 3). The Senate Standing Committee summarised the issues 
with the pre-reform system as encompassing “duplication, inconsistency, cost and inconvenience” 
with the reforms introducing a “simpler, cheaper, less traumatic [system that] … protects vulnerable 
42 Earlier attempts to bring de facto property and financial matters under the jurisdiction of the Family Court by cross-vesting the jurisdiction of the states to the 
Family Court of Australia where de facto parties also had parenting matters to be determined, had previously broken down as a result of complications arising from 
the constraints of the Australian Constitution.  
43 The Federal Magistrates Court of Australia is now known as the Federal Circuit Court of Australia following the passage, assent and proclamation of the Federal 
Circuit Court of Australia Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (Cth).  
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parties in de facto relationship breakdowns, particularly children” (Senate Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008, pp. 23–24).
Significant support for the reforms was also apparent in the submissions made to the Senate Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs Inquiry into the Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters and 
Other Measures) Bill 2008 (“the Inquiry”), with a “key reason” nominated for the reforms being 
that “it would streamline processes for both same-sex and opposite-sex de facto couples, and allow 
them access to the specialised forum of the Family Court … to resolve property and maintenance 
disputes at the same time as child related proceedings” (Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, 2008, p. 13). Evidence before the Inquiry from the Family Law Section of 
the Law Council for Australia highlighted the “significant cost and … [the] stress on the families” 
who were required to have their parenting matters and financial issues resolved in two different 
jurisdictions (Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008, p. 14).
The increasing uptake of de facto cohabitation and the consequential increase in the number of 
children being born to de facto partners, together with research indicating a greater likelihood 
of parental separation and financial disadvantage to be experienced by children of de facto 
relationships, were further significant factors highlighted as justifying the need for the reforms.44 In 
their submission to the Inquiry, the Australian Institute of Family Studies (AIFS) referred to 2006 
census data indicating that 15 per cent of parties living together were cohabiting as de facto couples, 
with AIFS identifying the potential for the reforms “to alleviate some of the stress associated with 
relationship breakdown for this section of the population” (Weston et al., 2008, p. 1). The Family 
Law Section, Law Council of Australia, also pointed to the “high and ever-increasing percentage” of 
Australians choosing to live in de facto rather than married relationships as advancing “the objective 
that family law should apply in a consistent and uniform way to married and de facto relationships 
nationally”, describing the legislation as “much needed and socially advantageous” (Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008, p. 14).
The varying state and territory de facto regimes were also identified as providing the children of 
de facto parties with “less protection compared to children of married couples” (Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008, p. 14).
Referring to data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) and the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children (LSAC) in support 
of these observations (Weston et al., 2008, p. 1–2),45 AIFS identified in their submission to the 
Inquiry that:
  children were increasingly being born to parents living in de facto relationships;
  these children were less well-off than children living with married parents; and
  these children were more likely to experience parental separation.
AIFS concluded that “given the increasing prevalence of cohabiting relationships, and the increasing 
number of children cared for in such relationships, the removal of legal distinctions between 
the post-separation financial regulation of cohabiting and married relationships appears justified” 
(Weston et al., p. 3).
Findings from the most recent wave of AIFS’ Longitudinal Study of Separated Families reflect the 
utility of extending the application of the FLA property and financial regime to separated de facto 
couples given that they are now more likely to engage legal services since the post-reform period as 
opposed to settling their property and financial arrangements without a specific process of dispute 
resolution.46
44 See for example, Willmott et al. (2003), p. 38.
45 For more detailed discussion of the relevant research see Qu, & Weston (2008).
46 The wave three data from the Longitudinal Study of Separated Families (LSSF) identified that “post-reform” participants were more likely to nominate their main 
pathways for property division as involving lawyers (28% v. 11%) or courts (7% v. 1%). Much lower proportions of parents in the post-reform group had resolved 
their property/financial matters without a specific process of dispute resolution. The researchers observe that while “it cannot be assumed that these differences 
are attributable in part to the reforms, nor can it be assumed that they are not” (Qu, Weston, Moloney, Kaspiew, & Dunstan, 2014, p. 101).
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Evidence before the Inquiry from the Family Law Section, Law Council of Australia, also identified 
that the pre-reform system was such that “a large segment of the community, especially women, [were 
left] without adequate legal protection” and that “older women [were] … severely disadvantaged on 
relationship breakdown” (Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008, p. 17). 
On the flipside, the availability of the option of superannuation splitting, the simpler process by which 
to obtain consent orders from the Family Law Courts and the reduced costs of avoiding proceedings 
in the state and territory courts were also identified by the Senate Standing Committee as arguments 
that were advanced in favour of the reforms from the perspective of the more economically powerful 
party to the de facto relationship (Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
2008, pp. 25–26).
In recommending the reforms, the Senate Standing Committee in its concluding views summarised 
the significant reasons underlying the rationale for change, including the need to “streamline legal 
processes … and to provide a national scheme” that enabled the increasing number of Australians 
in de facto relationships access to the federal family law system for both parenting and property/
financial matters (Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008, p. 49). The 
reduction of the costs and inconvenience for de facto parties, and the reduction of the burden on 
the court systems were also nominated as significant reasons for the reforms, as was the reforms’ 
importance for children of de facto relationships that had broken down (p. 49). The Senate Standing 
Committee indicated its strong support for the inclusion of same-sex couples in the definition of 
de facto relationships and that the “removal of discrimination the basis of sexuality in the family 
law system is long overdue” (Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008, 
p. 49).
Criticisms of the reforms
The goal of affording the same property and financial rights to all cohabiting couples without 
discriminating on the basis of marital status or gender is a laudable one. The expediency of establishing 
a single, specialist jurisdiction to deal with all post-separation family law matters and the benefits of 
the protection afforded to children and vulnerable partners in de facto relationships are also clear.
However, concern has been raised about the legitimacy of undertaking such a “profound policy 
shift” as to impose “the legal consequences that flow from the parties’ conscious commitment and 
attach from the time of that commitment” upon people for whom this conscious commitment is 
absent—indeed, on parties who “may well have made the conscious, considered and very deliberate 
decision not to marry” (Kovacs, 2009, pp. 105–106). People can no longer choose to circumvent 
the legal consequences of a marriage relationship by opting for a de facto relationship instead. The 
potential for the reforms to apply in the context of casual relationships or casual affairs has also 
been noted (Stidston, 2012, pp. 46, 49; Wainwright & Cook, 2013, p. 6). Kovacs (2009) has argued 
that the reforms gave rise to “radical consequences” (p. 109), cautioning that they may undermine 
the endurance of stable de facto relationships if people are required to arrange their lives with 
a view to circumventing the FLA (p. 110). In the context of a discussion about the maintenance 
provisions introduced by the reforms, Kovacs observed that:
People often choose not to marry precisely because they wish to avoid the legal obligations 
of marriage. They may have already experienced a costly divorce and wish to preserve their 
assets for their children or their income for their own future security. They may live together 
in a relationship which in fact endures for 2 years or more (or periods totalling 2 years or 
more) but which one or both of them never intended to be a life long commitment. (Kovacs, 
2009, p. 111)
Professor Patrick Parkinson’s submission to Inquiry similarly observed that the reforms had the 
effect of applying the “marriage paradigm … to people who have never chosen that, who had a 
free choice whether to choose it and who would be shocked to know that they are being treated 
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as if they are married when they are not” (Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, 2008, p. 20).
Professor Parkinson argued further that the Australian public had not been asked whether they 
wanted marriages and de facto relationships to be treated equally and that as a result, the reforms 
were premature (Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008, p. 20). 
More recently, Parkinson has also observed the limited empirical evidence of public attitudes to 
the division of property (Parkinson, 2012, p. 678). This view contrasted with other submissions to 
the Senate Standing Committee, including that of the New South Wales Law Society who suggested 
that the reforms reflected the change in community values—that is, that the reforms reflected “the 
viewpoint that the law should treat the economic consequences of the breakdown of opposite-
sex and same-sex de facto relationships in the same way as the economic consequences of the 
breakdown of marital relationships” (Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
2008, p. 21).
The ability of parties to enter a binding financial agreement to avoid these legal consequences 
was also raised in response to concerns about the extension of the property/financial regime 
applicable to married people, albeit that this mechanism may be too costly an option for many 
de facto couples (Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008). Millbank 
(2008), for example, has argued that “It makes absolute sense to put de facto and married couples 
in the same property regime. It does not remove people’s choice; it protects the vulnerable party 
in an economic and emotional relationship” (Millbank in Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, 2008, p. 24).47
Objections to the reforms have also been based on a perceived diminution of the status of marriage 
by affording de facto parties with the rights and responsibilities previously only afforded to people 
who have undertaken the commitment to marry (Willmott et al., 2003, p. 45; Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008, p. 13). Parkinson, for example, submitted to 
the Senate Standing Committee that the reforms should not precede an investigation of whether they 
would “undermine marriage (which the Government ought to be promoting because of its much 
greater stability), [by] treat[ing] marriages and de facto relationships as being entirely equivalent” 
(Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008, p. 17). 
Although arguments in support of the primacy of marriage suggested that the greater stability 
that marriage provided was a preferred environment for raising children, AIFS’ evidence to the 
Inquiry indicated that although the research had identified de facto relationships as less stable 
and that the developmental outcomes for the children of de facto parents were less positive than 
for children of married parents, these differences were “‘largely explained’ by the differences in 
characteristics between marriage and cohabitation, including that ‘those who cohabit are more 
likely to be younger and to be of a lower socioeconomic status’” (Senate Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008, p. 18). The implication is that on the available research, it 
is not clear that children fare better when born to married parties by virtue of the fact that their 
parents are married, rather than their welfare being related more to the differences between the 
parents who do marry and the parents who do not (rather than differences in their marital status) 
(Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008, p. 19).
The very fact that the reforms introduced substantive changes to the law then applicable to de 
facto parties in some states (including New South Wales),48 was one that drew criticism from some 
commentators who argued that as a result of the incorporation of the full suite of additional, 
proscriptive considerations, the reforms provided an avenue for “opportunistic claims” by de facto 
partners who have made limited contributions to the parties’ pool of assets but have significant 
future needs (Kovacs, 2009, p. 110), although it is notable that the same potential for opportunistic 
47 See also Millbank (2009). 
48 Note, however, that the Senate Committee observed that the New South Wales Law Reform Commission had already recommended bringing the New South Wales 
legislation, as the it then was, into line with the FLA (Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008, p. 25).
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claims arises in the context of marriages. Kovacs also drew attention to the broader impact of the 
reforms on creditors with the Family Law Courts now able to award property to the de facto partner 
of an insolvent person ahead of the trustee in bankruptcy and other creditors, a measure that 
significantly extends the privilege previously only afforded to married couples; a privilege which 
was already the subject of criticism (Kovacs, 2009, pp. 112–113).
Conclusion
This paper provides non-legal professionals with a general outline of the reforms, introduced in 2009, 
to the way that de facto property and financial settlements are made upon separation. Awareness 
of these reforms among family law sector professionals is essential to enable the provision of 
appropriate assistance and referral to relevant services. The reforms extending the federal family 
law property and financial provisions to separating de facto couples are not a panacea. As illustrated 
in the case studies in Box 2, non-married litigants may still face the indignity of their privacy being 
invaded (Behrens, 2010, pp. 359–360; Behrens, in Farouque, 2012). While married parties, by 
virtue of their marriage certificate, are not required to prove that their relationship existed, de facto 
couples may be required to “divulge … their personal habits and sexual proclivities” (Nambiar, in 
Farouque, 2012; Smyth v Pappas [2011] FamCA 434) to satisfy the threshold requirement before 
consideration of their substantive claim for property and financial settlement.
Despite the difficulties, on balance, the introduction of a (near) national, uniform, property/financial 
regime for separating families has been broadly identified as being warranted (Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2008). The shift in the public policy debate and, 
more particularly, the strength of calls supportive of the reforms, has given rise to a broadening of 
the scope of legislative protection for people in de facto relationships that were disadvantaged by 
the state and territory regimes. It has streamlined the application of the FLA property and financial 
provisions in the post-separation context and provided the Family Law Courts, the courts with 
the expertise in family law matters, with largely exclusive jurisdiction to determine property and 
financial settlements for separating families without discrimination on the basis of marital status or 
sexuality. Following on from the insights available from AIFS’ most recent wave of the Longitudinal 
Study of Separated Families, further and more specific research will now be required to explore 
whether and if so, how, these reforms are effective in accommodating the post-separation property 
and financial settlements of de facto couples.
Resources on de facto relationships and the FLA
Family Law Courts—De facto relationships information page: <www.familylawcourts.gov.au/wps/
wcm/connect/FLC/Home/Separation+and+Divorce/De+facto+relationships>.
Family Relationships Online—Property division when de facto relationships break down (Fact Sheet): 
<www.familyrelationships.gov.au/BrochuresandPublications/Pages/propertydivisionwhendefacto 
relationshipsbreakdown.aspx>
Family Relationships Advice Line: 1800 050 321 <www.familyrelationships.gov.au/services/fral/
pages/default.aspx>
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